Socially mediated populism: the communicative strategies of political leaders on Facebook by Mazzoleni, Gianpietro & Bracciale, Roberta
ARTICLE
Socially mediated populism: the communicative
strategies of political leaders on Facebook
Gianpietro Mazzoleni1 & Roberta Bracciale2
ABSTRACT Populism has been deﬁned in many different ways, mostly in regard to political
ideology and political dynamics, but only in recent years in relation to communication vari-
ables. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the identiﬁcation of a socially mediated type of
populist communication profoundly affected by the speciﬁc nature of social media. It presents
and discusses empirical evidence on Italy’s populist and non-populist leaders that use
Facebook regularly, and highlights the extent of the overﬂow of populist communication
patterns and ideological features into mainstream political communication. Populist ideology
fragments emerged in Italian leaders’ Facebook posts, thus leading to two main conclusions:
ﬁrst, populism appears to be ‘endemic’ in the Italian online facebooksphere; second, political
actors—even non-populist ones—do not disdain the adoption of typical populist rhetorics.
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Introduction
While we were writing this paper, thousands of far-rightdemonstrators with faces covered took to the streets ofWarsaw waving ﬂags and burning red ﬂares, chanting
slogans like ‘White Europe of brotherly nations,’ ‘Pure Poland,
white Poland!’ and ‘Refugees get out!’. A banner read: ‘Pray for an
Islamic Holocaust’ (The Guardian 12 November 2017). What was
thought unthinkable at the turn of the Millennium has become
the reality over recent years. To initiate the slide that led to the
present state of affairs in Europe was Austria, which embarked
the populist party Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ), led at
the time by the charismatic leader Jörg Haider, in a national
government coalition in 2000. There followed Sweden, Hungary,
Finland, Norway, Poland, Czech Republic, and it has again been
Austria to close the current cycle by striking a new deal between
Österreichische Volkspartei with FPÖ. Where the populists are
not in power or failed to acquire it by democratic means, they
have achieved signiﬁcant approval ratings in the past decade:
Marine Le Pen’s Front National, Geert Wilders’ PVV, Matteo
Salvini’s Lega Nord, Beppe Grillo’s 5 Star Movement, and Ger-
many’s AfD, to mention only the most known, reﬂecting the rise
of sympathies for populist parties (see Fig. 1).
Other populist formations of varying political weight have
intermittently arisen and also dissolved—not without having ﬁrst
provoked political turmoil—as was the case of Nigel Farage’s
Ukip, credited with the ‘Brexit mayhem’.
As the scholarly literature has duly pointed out (Rooduijn,
2014; Taggart, 2004), populism is not always and everywhere
synonymous with far-right, extremist, sovereignty-demanding
movements. In Europe one sees left-wing parties such as Syriza
and Podemos sharing themes and rhetorics (like anti-elitism)
with the parties on the other side of the political/populist spec-
trum, even if starting from a different ideological perspective. It is
also evident that several traditional parties and their leaders, be
they in government or not, at different political latitudes, have
adopted rhetorics and tones that undoubtedly resemble those of
movements and leaders that deﬁne themselves as populist. These
are clear examples of what Mudde (2004) calls the ‘populist
Zeitgeist’, i.e., that populist discourse has become mainstream in
today’s politics.
If all politicians are affected by some sort of populist zeitgeist, it
is legitimate to ask if there is at least a difference in the intensity
of recourse to populist tones, assertions and allusions. One cannot
expect leaders like, say, Angela Merkel or Mariano Rajoy, sud-
denly to convert to a bullying populist language. It is, however,
conceivable that they endorse some bellicose demands on behalf
of critical sectors of their public opinions that are typically
addressed by populist leaders. It is the tone and the presence of
some key features of populist discourse that mark the difference.
In this paper, we shall examine social media usage by Italian
political actors to determine whether there is a signiﬁcant dif-
ference between populist and mainstream parties such to hypo-
thesise the existence of an ‘endemic’ sort of populist
communication, a sort of ‘overﬂow’ of populist discourse into the
domestic conventional political discourse.
In the next section, we shall present a more detailed oper-
ationalization of the main features of political discourse, applied
to political leaders, examined within the context of their usage of
social media. Then we will concentrate on the varieties of
populism and on their operationalization in empirical research in
the section on research design and methodology. In the last
section, we will discuss the existence of a socially mediated,
endemic populism.
Media, social media and populism: where do we stand?
Among the challenges facing research on populism pointed out
by Aalberg and de Vreese (2017) when introducing a large-scale
study on Europe’s populisms, there is one of particular
Fig. 1 Average share of votes for populist parties in Europe. The ﬁgure shows the average share of votes gained by populist parties from 1980 to 2017.
Source: https://www.theatlas.com/charts/Bkmr5DQHW
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importance: ‘understanding the extent to which populist dis-
course enters the mainstream […]’. (Aalberg and de Vreese,
2017). It is indeed a challenge because any research on populist
phenomena has to spell out a deﬁnition of what exactly is meant
by ‘populism’. The term has become lately so popular in academic
research that it has generated such a huge volume of scholarly
reﬂection on various designations of (political) populism that one
wonders if we are utilising a passe-partout concept. In fact, it
covers phenomena unmistakably recognisable as populist as well
as phenomena that before the recent academic frenzy were simply
identiﬁed as protest, conﬂictual, anti-government actions.
In our study, we do not attempt to put forth a further deﬁni-
tion of populism because we draw on the positions worked out by
the most recent scholarly debate, like the one in Reinemann et al.
(2017), based on a large body of research that highlights the
ideological and communicative dimensions of the phenomenon
(De Cleen, 2012; Freeden, 2006; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007;
Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). Here,
populism is taken as ‘a general, abstract concept about politics
and society that is open to a diverse set of more concrete political
ideas and programs, depending on both national and historic
contexts’ (p 13). The core features that distinguish it from other
ideologies are: (1) the centrality of the idea (or of the ideas) of the
‘people’ (p 18), around which populists try ‘to create a new social
identity among citizens […] in order to unite them and generate a
sense of belonging to an imagined community’ (p 19); and (2) the
construction of ‘the others’ as counterparts taking the form of
elites and/or out-groups against which the people afﬁrm their
preeminence (pp 19–21).
Jagers and Walgrave (2007) have provided some insightful
‘measures’ of populist communication: empty, exclusionary, anti-
elitist, and complete populism. In our study, we elaborate on their
perspective and envisage a continuum from the lowest degree of
populism (in politicians’ socially mediated/mediatized commu-
nication) to the highest degree.
Our core interest is to identify the implications of the link of
populist phenomena with the communication eco-systems.
Populist leaders and movements have everywhere constantly
relied on the visibility and the ensuing popularity assured by the
coverage, both critical and supportive, of mainstream and popular
media. To be sure, the legacy media keep intact their traditional
role, mostly unintentional, of ‘king makers’ for political ﬁgures
and movements. However, the communication environment that
has been developing with the expansion of the Internet and of
digital technology has impressively changed the rules of the game
and has made available to political actors an unprecedented
abundance of communication tools: new platforms, new outlets,
social media with potentially huge publics. Chadwick (2013) has
called this new communication landscape ‘hybrid’ insofar as it
merges the mass media and the new digital media into a new
indissoluble whole.
The social media are structurally different from traditional
media that were and to a large extent still are characterised by the
sender-receiver asymmetry. They follow a ‘media logic’ different
from that of television, radio, and print outlets, and in the case of
the news industry the media maintain the role of gatekeepers.
Digital technology has made it possible to establish interactive
relations between senders and receivers, allowing both to bypass
the forceful power of mass media.
A ‘new media logic’ is in play in the political/populist digital
communications. It has distinct features with respect to the mass
media logic envisaged by Altheide and Snow (1979, 1991). A
recent study has provided an interesting theoretical approach to
what the authors call ‘network media logic’ (Klinger and Svens-
son, 2015), speciﬁcally concerning the domain of social media
from the three perspectives of production, distribution and usage.
‘The network media logic of production is indicative of more
individualised forms of media content production compared to
mass media where professionals judge what constitutes worthy
information or not’ (p 7). The logic of distribution has to do with
the logic of virality (‘network-enhanced word of mouth’) typical
of online social platforms, where ‘popularity among like-minded
users, not professional gatekeepers, decides whether information
is relevant and passed on (i.e., goes viral) or not’. (p 9). Finally,
the usage of social media tends to take the form of a commu-
nication among the like-minded in ‘niche networks based on
interest rather than location. So, where mass media consumption
to a larger extent is bound to geographically deﬁned commu-
nities, social media platforms are bound to communities of peers
and like-minded others’ (p 10).
In the speciﬁc case of socially mediated populist communica-
tion, the network media logic means that populist leaders’ linkage
with their constituencies or sympathisers is entirely disin-
termediated: that is, the production of contents is free from being
ﬁltered by journalists or other types of gatekeepers. ‘The online
environment frequently allows for the circumvention of tradi-
tional opinion leaders and facilitates what has been referred to as
the ‘one-step ﬂow of communication’ ’ (Engesser et al., 2017: p
1283). At the same time the horizontality and ubiquitousness of
social media allow a vast circulation of populist content with high
potential impact, thanks to a viral diffusion, if with signiﬁcant
conﬁnes in the ‘echo-chamber’ environment ‘where political
attitudes are conﬁrmed and ampliﬁed’, and in the ‘homophily’ of
the Internet, where one observes the ‘ﬁlter bubble which pre-
selects consonant media content’ (Engesser et al. 2017: p 1284).
The disintermediation processes that characterise the hybrid
media system (Chadwick, 2013) foster the spread of populist
ideology in a fragmented form (Aalberg et al., 2016; Bracciale,
Martella, 2017; Engesser et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). This is
because political actors directly address citizens by means of
social media and, in order to ﬁt their personal action frames
(Bennett and Segerberg 2012), blur and fragment populist refer-
ences in their messages.
If we consider the (mass) media logic as the ‘engine’ of a
mediatisation of politics (Mazzoleni, 2008: p 2932), we might
speculate if the ‘network media logic’ contributes in a similar
manner to a new process of mediatisation of politics and, in the
case considered here, of political populism. In the new media
ecosystem, can we envisage a ‘social-media populism’ carrying
mediatizing effects of populist communication? Certainly, the
nature of online digital media boosts the already highly perso-
nalised kind of communication of the populist leaders (Engesser
et al., 2017, pp 1284–1285). Arguably, social media contribute to
dramatising populist communication because they are platforms
suited to producing emotional, controversial, even violent con-
tents typical of much populist activism, and to stimulating a
‘remix’ activity, a creative collage of video clips, sound bites,
clickbaits, grafﬁti, parodies, memes, and many other contents,
including insults and fake-news, that can prove crucial in
boosting the popularity of the leader, of his/her creed, of his/her
movement.
In sum, (1) the individualised form of populist communication
via social media, (2) its popularity-geared inclination, (3) its
disintermediated nature, (4) its fostering like-minded commu-
nities, are to be taken as strong indicators of a distinctive process
of mediatisation of political communication. What we see in the
speciﬁc context of populist leaders’ communication, in their fol-
lowers’ usage of social media, in the media coverage of populist
events, in the ensuing public debate in the digital public sphere
and in off-line environs, is a high-intensity sort of mediatisation,
i.e., a ‘hyper-mediatisation’ of populist communication. This is all
the more true in the present hybrid media ecosystem.
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Research design and methodology
Research questions. The consequences for the political com-
munication of any new or established leader or party, and espe-
cially of how populist actors exploit the hybrid communication
environment, are signiﬁcant—as testiﬁed by the extant copious
scholarly production. Reﬂections on the features of populist
communication in the social media environment raise speciﬁc
questions that we have tried to address in empirical research
conducted on the Italian political leaders.
RQ1. Is it possible to identify the existence of an ‘endemic
populism’ in social media as used by political actors?
RQ2. What are the speciﬁc aspects of socially mediated
populism?
RQ3. What are the different degrees of populism in the rhetoric
used by leaders on Facebook social media?
Case selection. To answer the research questions, we analysed the
Facebook timelines of the following Italian political leaders, who
stand out as the most noticeable in the domestic political arena:
Silvio Berlusconi (leader of the centre-right party Forza Italia),
Luigi Di Maio (front-runner of the Five Stars Movement), Giorgia
Meloni (leader of the far-right party Brothers of Italy), Matteo
Salvini (leader of the right-wing party Northern League), and
Matteo Renzi (leader of the Democratic Party).
According to the existing literature, three of these parties are
considered populist: the Five Stars Movement because of its
historical opposition to traditional parties and media, regarded as
a single corrupt entity (Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013); the
Northern League due to its political message against political and
economic élites and its constant appeal to the ‘people’ identiﬁed
on ethnic bases (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008) so much so
that it is called ‘an almost ideal-type incarnation of populism’
(Tarchi, 2015a, b: p 243); and Forza Italia and Silvio Berlusconi,
these being deﬁned as neoliberal populists (Bobba and McDon-
nell, 2016), often ‘accusing the elite (i.e., mainstream parties and
trade unions) of frustrating the hard-working common people
with unnecessary laws and high taxes’ (Mudde and Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2017: p 35).
The other leaders are also interesting cases because, even
though they are not immediately acknowledged as populist actors,
their political ideas and their rhetoric often espouse typical
populist stances. Brothers of Italy, an ally of Berlusconi’s centre-
right coalition, is an offshoot of the former leading party of the
right, Alleanza Nazionale, whose ideology has been deﬁned
nationalist but not populist (Tarchi, 2015a, b). The Democratic
Party is ‘by deﬁnition’ a liberal, moderate, anti-populist forma-
tion. However, its leader’s speeches have often targeted certain
elites and the Democratic Party’s old leadership with bullying
accents. Matteo Renzi regarded his struggle to seize the party’s
leadership as a clash between innovators and conservatives,
young against old, etc. (Bordignon, 2014).
Sample. In Italy, there are 43 million Internet users; 34 million
social media users and 34 million active users monthly on
Facebook. This means that social media users in Italy are almost
entirely also Facebook users.
All the principal Italian political leaders have a Facebook page.
The Facebook timelines of the above ﬁve leaders, dating from 1
October 2016 to 1 October 2017, were downloaded through
Facebook Graph API. In total we collected 3725 posts (Table 1).
If we look at the engagement generated by the posts of the
political leaders, we can highlight that every post received a
minimum average of over 7000 interactions (Giorgia Meloni),
and a maximum of more than 25000 (Matteo Salvini).
It is evident that Italian internet users are very active on
Facebook: in 1 year the ﬁve leaders received more than 53 million
interactions (that is, likes, reactions, comments and sharing) from
their followers, compared with 34 million social media users
estimated in Italy.
In order to subset the entire database for the analysis, Facebook
posts were sampled according to the distribution of received
shares: for each leader, we selected the most shared posts (the
posts in the ﬁrst percentile of distribution for number of shares
received). We chose this criterion for selection because, given the
speciﬁc affordances of Facebook, the more posts are shared, the
more they become visible on the social media platform, and the
politicians’ posts can reach the broad public through the public
interactions (Bene, 2017). Accordingly, 934 posts were analysed:
Berlusconi, 66; Di Maio, 283; Meloni, 216; Renzi, 156; Salvini, 213.
The posts were analysed by searching for the presence of
populist ideology fragments. All posts were coded by two trained
coders,1 who used a content analysis coding schema built
according the following systematisation of the populist ideology.
Indicators were transformed into a set of dichotomous variables
in order to highlight the presence (1), or the absence (0), of each
indicator in a leader’s posts. The indicators are not mutually
exclusive.
Measuring the degree of populist communicative ideology
Drawing on the most recent literature on populism as commu-
nication style (Aalberg et al., 2016; Bracciale and Martella, 2017;
Bobba, 2018; Cranmer, 2011; Engesser et al., 2017; Jagers and
Walgrave, 2007; Wirth et al., 2016), populist ideology was broken
down into the following dimensions: (1) Appeal to ‘the people’;
(2) Attacking the élite; and (3) Ostracising the others. For each
dimension we provide an example from the message data sets
analysed.
Appeal to ‘the people’. ‘Appeal to the people’ means referring to
the people in a manner that presumes or calls upon their consent.
The word ‘people’ is a catch-all expression that politicians use,
irrespective of their political afﬁliation, to unite the electorate.
The construction of ‘the people’ means: ‘appeals to the people,
talking about the people, putting the people and their options ﬁrst
in political decisions, or symbolically and rhetorically uniting
Table 1 Italian political leaders’ Facebook pages engagement (1 October 2017)
Leader Fans Posts (a) Likes (b) Reactions (c) Comments (d) Shares (e) Engagement
(f= b+c+d+e)
Engagement
mean (f/a)
Silvio
Berlusconi
940,790 263 1,136,033 1,215,125 233,837 194,032 2,779,027 10566.6
Luigi Di Maio 1,084,813 1130 3,731,244 4,048,822 607,499 2,340,516 10,728,081 9493.9
Giorgia Meloni 719,553 863 2,374,421 2,707,586 412,438 809,641 6,304,086 7304.9
Matteo Salvini 1,911,328 851 6,950,592 8,219,862 2,286,546 4,418,237 21,875,237 25705.3
Matteo Renzi 1,080,164 618 4,724,452 5,108,105 1,602,670 689,723 12,124,950 19619.7
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with the people by talking about ‘we’ and ‘us’ ’ (Aalberg et al.,
2016; Akkerman et al., 2014; Alvares and Dahlgren, 2016; Biorcio,
2015; Canovan, 1999; Engesser et al., 2017; Hawkins et al., 2012;
Krämer, 2014; Kriesi, 2014; Laclau, 2005; Mény and Surel, 2002;
Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Taggart, 2000;
Wirth et al., 2016). Considering that all politicians—more so now
that they have access to social media—refer to and talk about the
people almost all the time (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007), we
identiﬁed some sub-dimensions of the most common construc-
tion of ‘the people’ according to the literature, and searched for
their presence in our leaders’ Facebook posts.
a. Sovereignty: ‘the people’ is the ultimate democratic sovereign
or the ‘ruler’ often betrayed by the elites. Thus, the people’s
will is a fundamental principle for political actors that depict
themselves as advocates of the people’s rights. In this sense,
direct democracy is a typical theme of the populist discourse
addressing the people as sovereign.
Silvio Berlusconi—7 August 2017
[…] above all, I feel the suffering of Italians who feel unsafe
in their homes, harassed by taxes, disillusioned with politics
and anti-politics. And I feel a great responsibility. More and
more Italians are asking me, at Forza Italia, on the centre-
right, to radically change things that are wrong in our
country. To put an end to ﬁscal oppression, bureaucratic
oppression and judicial oppression.
Giorgia Meloni—24 November 2016
[….] I think that it will be a good day for the Italians the
day when they can recover their sovereignty and can choose
their governments and when we will no longer have an
executive of lobbies and Merkel but a government of Italy
and the Italians[…].
Matteo Renzi—30 April 2017
[….] if it had gone otherwise, Italy would today be stronger
in Europe and beyond. And politics would not be
stagnating in a swamp of embarrassing delays with time-
wasting on the electoral law. But the people have decided
and the people are always right.
b. Class: political actors refer to the people as ‘underprivileged
citizens who differ from the elites mainly with respect to their
economic situation, formal education and access to power’
(Reinemann et al., 2017: p 17). Accordingly, ‘the people’ are
depicted as a deprived socio-economic class or subset of the
population (i.e., hard-working citizens, artisans, retirees, etc.)
disregarded by governments and political elites.
Luigi Di Maio—2 February 2017
[….] Here we are witnessing the massacre of a generation
now supposed to split the world. The members of
parliament don’t give a toss about all this because they
get high pensions at the age of 65 for having worked for just
four and a half years and are offended if you tell them that
it is a life annuity and a privilege[…].
Matteo Renzi—4 April 2017
If I could go back, not only would I redo the 80€ but I
would raise the bonus to 100 because this measure served to
restore purchasing power to families. In fact the middle
class appreciates it, the super rich such as Berlusconi and
Grillo do not!
c. Nation/Ethnic group: here ‘the people’ is understood as a
national community or ethnic group, with emphasis on
belonging to the native population as the main criterion to
discriminate who is part or not part of the nation.
Matteo Salvini—14 November 2016
Thanks to the Renzi government, illegal immigrants are
enjoying hotel accommodation, while Italians are homeless.
Also for this reason on 4 December #Ivoteno
Silvio Berlusconi—07 July 2017
The Democratic Party is insisting by all means on
enactment of the new Ius Soli law. It is a wrong law that
the Italians do not want and that has nothing to do with
reception. We want it to be possible for those who feel truly
Italian to become Italian, not those who have only gone
through a few bureaucratic steps. Perhaps the Democratic
Party hopes to create a pool of new voters in this way.
There is even talk of 800,000 people. If so I must say that it
is a short-sighted and also cynical calculation on the skin of
Italians
d. Cultural: the people is ‘our people’ not based on formal
citizenship or ethnicity but rather on shared and common
values, religion, history, customs.
Matteo Renzi—29 October 2016
It was a wonderful party of a people that does not scream,
that does not insult. Doing politics means proposing, not
just saying No #weTakeTheStreets
Matteo Renzi—14 April 2017
[….] we are not just sharing a video or news item. We are
sharing a political idea that is based on proposal and not on
protest. That is based on true documents and not on false
signatures. That creates concrete projects for the country
not evidence invented against someone. We are like this: a
community of women and men who try to demonstrate
every day step by step that you can change things without
moaning and screaming.
Matteo Salvini—6 June 2017
Were I in government tomorrow morning I would NOT
concede even half a square metre to the Islamic commu-
nities until they sign black on white that WOMEN have the
same RIGHTS as men. Is that understood? THIS IS HOW
IT WORKS AT OUR HOME!
Giorgia Meloni—19 August 2017
What can we do to combat Islamic terrorism? As Brothers
of Italy-National Alliance, we have been repeating it for
years: 1. Prohibit Islamic fundamentalist propaganda such
as the Salaﬁte and Wahabi propaganda of Saudi Arabia and
Qatar, which theorise the use of violence against inﬁdels; 2.
Stop immigration from countries with an Islamic majority;
3. Allow foreigners who share and respect our culture to
stay in Europe; the others must return home, 4. Do not
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automatically grant citizenship, but only to those who
demonstrate their willingness to integrate. More than ius
soli! 5. Assert our Greek, Roman and Christian roots and
make it clear that we will never resign ourselves to the
islamisation of Europe.
Attacking the élite. This second dimension of the concept of
populism is built on anti-elitism and anti-establishment stances.
It refers to the typical populist rhetoric that emphasises the dis-
tance between ‘us’ and ‘them’. ‘Us’ stands for the common citizen
and ‘them’ represents the common enemy established by the
dominant elite, which may sometimes be identiﬁed under dif-
ferent headings (politics, media, economic powers, etc.).
According to a Manichean view of society elites are corrupt,
exploitative, and disrespectful of the real interests and needs of
the people (Akkerman et al., 2014; Albertazzi and McDonnell,
2008; Biorcio, 2015; Bos et al., 2013; Caiani and Graziano, 2016;
Canovan, 1981; Hawkins et al., 2012; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007;
Mény and Surel, 2002; Mudde, 2004; Taggart, 2000; van Kessel
and Castelein, 2016; Wirth et al., 2016). Targeted elites can vary
according to the context and the aims of the political actors:
political, economic, institutional, media, intellectuals, etc.
Giorgia Meloni—9 September 2016
In the U.S. the people won against the elites, the oligarchies,
high ﬁnance and the dominant ideology. The same will
happen in Italy on 4 December: Italian citizens will not
listen to radical-chic people but will vote against this
government, which has not been elected, in order to regain
their sovereignty.
Luigi Di Maio—22 March 2017
They have just rejected our proposal to eliminate the
privileged pension of parliamentarians. It is a shame. They
chose to stay in the Middle Ages. We shall create another
country together with our citizens.
Matteo Renzi—16 June 2017
The umpteenth transport strike is a scandal. Yet another
one on Friday. It was proclaimed by small trade unions,
which once again use the alibi of privatisation. In Florence,
5 years ago, we put the service out to tender, and a public
company, the State Railways, won the contract. More can
be done, but now they manage it better than in the past.
Rather than three cable-cars, perhaps the Romans would
prefer to have a regular bus every 5 min: putting the service
to tender would cause the autonomous trade unions to lose
votes, but it would improve the lives of citizens. And in this
delicate tourist season: how can Alitalia be left on the
ground again? The right to strike is sacrosanct and must be
guaranteed. But also the citizens have a right not to be
mocked: it is not possible for a myriad of small trade unions
to paralyse Fridays in our cities.
Ostracising the others. ‘Ostracising the others’ involves a nar-
rative based on the ‘dangerous others’ concept that targets a
common enemy within groups of the population that are stig-
matised and excluded from ‘the people’. This is a new contra-
position between ‘us’, ‘the people’ as a homogenous category, and
‘them’, an enemy within the people. These out-groups are per-
ceived as uniform and usually regarded as inferior. Dangerous
others are often depicted as a threat and addressed by political
actors as scapegoats. (Aalberg et al., 2016; Biorcio, 2015; Cranmer,
2011; Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 2016;
Abts and Rummens, 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).
Ostracism towards out-groups can be expressed in two
different ways:
a. Dangerous others: political actors identify isolated groups
within the people as an internal enemy; stigmatising and
excluding segments of the people from the speciﬁc population.
Giorgia Meloni—28 July 2017
Three bastard fake refugees, supported by Italians’ money,
raped a 14-year-old girl in Trieste. […] Enough with out of
control immigration, enough with being fooled by illegal
immigrants passed off as refugees. […]
Luigi Di Maio—10 April 2017
Italy has imported from Romania 40% of its criminals.
While Romania is importing our companies and capital
from Italy. What about this EU! Since in Italy politics has
never wanted to make justice work—on the contrary, very
often it has deliberately sabotaged it—we are attracting
criminals while our businesses ﬂee to where the judicial
systems are more efﬁcient: as in Romania!
b. Authoritarianism: this is when political actors press for
severe political measures or illiberal policies against those
who threaten the homogeneity of the people.
Matteo Salvini—1 March 2017
1) chemical castration for paedophiles and rapists, whether
Italian or foreign, as in many civilised countries: you do it
once and you’ll never do it again!
2) abolish the offence of excessive self-defence: if you come
into my house, I will kill you before you can attack me!
3) Women’s Day is only a manifestation of hypocrisy if
SERIOUS LAWS are not enacted; certain BEASTS have to
go to PRISON (and throw away the key!).
Giorgia Meloni—19 January 2017
An army of 34 thousand potential terrorists has landed in
Europe together with illegal immigrants. Europol has said
this, not some insane populist [….]. We are not prepared to
allow ourselves to be invaded without reacting: stop
landings and create a naval blockade off the Libyan coast
to prevent the boats from leaving. The rest is complicity
with terrorists.
A populism index. Based on the above three dimensions we then
constructed a synthetic ‘Populism Index’ showing the different
extents to which populist ideology is espoused by leaders on
Facebook. In accordance with the idea that populist ideology in
social media spreads in fragmented forms, we considered as
populist every post that contained at least one populist reference.
The additive index ranges from 0, which means absence of
populist references, to 3, which corresponds to the presence of all
the above-mentioned dimensions of populism in the leaders’
Facebook posts:
● zero-level of populism: the posts do not contain any populist
references (value of index= 0);
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● soft populism: the posts contain only one populist reference
among the dimensions that build the populist ideology (value
of index= 1);
● moderate populism: the posts contain a combination of two
populist references (value of index= 2);
● bold populism: the posts contain all three populist references:
appeal to ‘the people’, attacking the elite, and ostracising the
others (value of index= 3).
Findings. Data from the content analysis shows that in 67% of
the posts there is at least one of the three dimensions of populist
ideology.
This ﬁrst ﬁnding conﬁrms the existence of what we have
hypothesised as an ‘endemic populism’ among all the leaders,
because more than half of the posts contain references to populist
issues (RQ1). Matteo Renzi also uses fragments of ideology in
62% of his posts, conﬁrming the idea that ‘going public’ through
social media ﬁts very well with the populist discourse.
Over and above this aggregate result, the indicators of each
dimension disclose a very differentiated adoption of populist
fragments by each leader (Fig. 2).
As expected, the ‘appeal to the people’ is the most frequent
ideology fragment (59%). The different meanings of the dimen-
sion afford better understanding of how ‘the people’ is identiﬁed
and rhetorically constructed, and make it possible to answer the
second research question (RQ2) by highlighting several aspects of
the socially mediated populism of the Italian leaders.
The ‘Emphasis on Sovereignty’ is mainly used by Silvio
Berlusconi (29%) and Luigi Di Maio (29%). Through this
rhetorical construction, leaders try to engage people as the actual
depositaries of sovereignty, and legitimate themselves as advo-
cates of the people’s will. In this sense, the emphasis on
sovereignty represents a characteristic of ‘soft populism’, which
in this case is interpreted in two different ways: advocacy by Silvio
Berlusconi (in defence of the people), and legitimisation by Luigi
Di Maio (stressing the direct democracy issue in his claim).
The construction of the people as Nation or Ethnicity is above
all adopted by right-wing leaders, and its use gradually increases
on shifting from the centre-right to the far-right: Silvio Berlusconi
(centre-right, 21%); Giorgia Meloni (nationalist right-wing, 34%);
and Matteo Salvini (xenophobic right-wing, 42%).
The appeal to the people as a socio-economic class is also
adopted by Silvio Berlusconi (12%) followed by Matteo Salvini
(11%) and Luigi Di Maio (9%). In this meaning, ‘the people’
addressed is composed of subsets of the whole population, often
depicted as abandoned by governments.
This is not a surprising ﬁnding in regard to the Northern
League, because this meaning of ‘the people’ has always been a
typical trait of its political discourse. In fact, since the beginning
of its history the party has constantly referred to the ‘virtuous,
hard-working small entrepreneur […] craftsmen and small
tradesmen struggling against major supermarket chains and
banks (that is, the powers-that-be who would strangle them)’
(Tarchi, 2008: pp 90–91)
The most unexpected result, which conﬁrms the existence of an
‘endemic populism’, is the adoption of many populist references
by Matteo Renzi, who is leader of an anything but populist party.
For this reason, we provide some additional explanation of his
case. Renzi tends to use the word ‘people’ in a cultural sense, i.e.,
based on shared values, beliefs, behaviours and aims. Since the
beginning of his leadership his political message has been
characterised by pairs of opposites used to stage the contra-
position between him (and ‘his people’) and various enemies. In
fact, Matteo Renzi «presents himself as the homo novus who has
gone against the ‘old boys’ of the PD» (Pasquino, 2016: p 392)
trying to draw a line between himself and the Italian politicians,
above all the old Democratic Party’s nomenklatura. These
contrapositions are rhetorically summarised by Renzi himself
with the expression ‘scrapping’ (rottamazione), by which is meant
the sacking of the old political establishment starting from that of
the Democratic Party.
Fig. 2 Populist ideology fragments in the Italian political leaders’ Facebook posts. This ﬁgure shows the percentage of each indicator of the populist ‘thin’
ideology in the analysed leaders’ Facebook posts. Each colour corresponds to one leader as shown in the legend
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0104-x ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 4:50 | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-018-0104-x | www.nature.com/palcomms 7
Many scholars have deﬁned Renzi as populist (‘light populist’,
‘populist from above’, ‘constructive populist’, etc.) due to several
nuances of his political ideas, style and rhetoric (Bobba and
Legnante, 2016; Bordignon, 2014; Ceccarini and Bordignon, 2017;
Salvati, 2016; Tarchi, 2015a, b). Firstly, he has always expressed
the intent to transform the Democratic Party into a leader-
centred party (Bordignon, 2014) and a catch-all party (the party
of the nation) (Pasquino, 2016) also according to his predilection
for rapid decision making. The direct connection with the people,
bypassing intermediaries like parties or trade unions is a well-
known populist trait.
According to recent analyses of Matteo Renzi’s discourse
(Bordignon, 2014), his style and rhetoric are often characterised
by the typical populist construction of ‘us against them’ in which
‘them’ are often depicted as ‘enemies of change’ (Salvati, 2016)
and ‘us’ change according to the political context or the aims of
the Democratic Party leader (i.e., citizens, local administrators,
etc.). Renzi has applied this rhetorical contraposition also against
trade unions accused of being inefﬁcient and self-referential elites
no longer representative (Bordignon, 2014; Salvati, 2016) and
against ‘jumped-up professors’ (labelled ‘owls’ or ‘canapé eaters’)
who criticise his reform projects (Tarchi, 2015a, b). Indeed, like
Silvio Berlusconi with the People of Freedom party, Matteo Renzi
was party secretary and Prime Minister at the same time, ruling
both the party and the government to the extent that some
scholars have highlighted this phenomenon as ‘presidentialization
of politics’ in the case of the Democratic Party (Fasano and
Seddone, 2016; Seddone and Venturino, 2015). Furthermore, he
has extremely personalised politics by introducing a new
dimension of personalisation in a left-wing party (Seddone and
Venturino, 2015) to the extent that even the last referendum on
his constitutional reforms (4th December 2016) became a popular
vote on Matteo Renzi’s leadership (Ceccarini and Bordignon,
2017).
All these elements can be found in his Facebook posts,
sometimes in watered-down versions due to the change of his
communicative strategy during the referendum campaign, above
all by using «antithetical categories that delineate a dichotomous
representation of reality» (Bordignon, 2014: p 17) like young or
new vs. old, love vs. hate, courage vs. fear, beautiful vs. ugly.
Four out of ten of his posts are characterised by this
contraposition, which changes according to the enemy of the
moment or the speciﬁc issue concerned (science vs. witchery
about vaccines, innovators vs. conservatives labelled as owls or
envious people, etc.).
Since his leadership is considered ‘divisive’ in Italy, Renzi needs
to directly address and appeal to this rhetorically constructed
community in order to cope with extra and intra-party
antagonism. This result appears coherent with the hypotheses
that also non-populist actors do not disdain from using populist
references in social media and that differences among leaders
emerge rather in the degree of populism (in the variety and
quantity of populist references used).
The other dimensions of populist ideology are generally less
present in the leaders’ posts compared to the ‘Appeal to the
people’: Attacking the elites (38%) and Ostracising Others (18%).
The most active in attacking the élites are clearly the hardline
populists Matteo Salvini (46%), Luigi Di Maio (43%) and Giorgia
Meloni (38%). Quite unexpectedly, Matteo Renzi, too, attacks the
élites—accusing them of being distant from the people—and the
media (23%)2.
The last dimension, which refers to the rhetorical construction
of the ‘dangerous others’, is a typical feature of the nationalist and
xenophobic right-wing formations. Matteo Salvini’s (53%)
narrative is imbued with such references: he turns every news
item into attacks on immigrants and refugees, almost always
referred to as ‘illegal immigrants’. Indeed, the vociferous leader of
the Northern League often shares news and videos that depict
‘immigrants’ as dangerous people opposed to (or in competition
with) national Italians. Giorgia Meloni’s posts appear less replete
with this rhetoric (24%), although she joined Salvini in the harsh
political battle against the so called ‘ius soli’ (law granting
citizenship to immigrants born on Italian soil).
The analysis carried out thus far has identiﬁed the typical
features of populist communication, but it has not yet shown the
‘degree of populism’ with which leaders address their audiences.
In order to take these differences into account and to answer the
third research question (RQ3), we used the ‘Populism Index’
previously outlined.
Overall, in Fig. 3, Silvio Berlusconi’s and Matteo Renzi’s
communication on Facebook emerges as the most ‘soft populist’.
Giorgia Meloni’s and Luigi Di Maio’s communication via social
media is characterised by a ‘moderate populism’ level. Finally,
Matteo Salvini’s communication is a good example of what we
identify as ‘bold populism’.
Discussion and conclusion: a socially mediated, endemic
populism?
The case of Italian populist and non-populist leaders that actively
use social media in their political communication is undoubtedly
just one of the several cases to be found in Europe’s national
contexts.
The phase of experimenting—with some apprehension and
ineptness by users—with the new outlets that immensely
empowered political communicators is now past. Facebook and
Twitter have become familiar platforms for both politicians and
citizens to articulate their comments or make their voices heard,
at times quite effectively. Populists are no exception. On the
contrary, populist communicators, more than other mainstream
party ﬁgures, can exploit to their great advantage the disin-
termediate nature of social media to offset hostile editorial cov-
erage by mainstream media. That is not to say that they are
blocked from access to the big media. As noted, their populist
action, often accompanied by ﬂamboyant personality traits, and
above all by their widely recognised skills as newsmakers, secure
large popular visibility. This is certainly the case of Italian
populist leaders, like Berlusconi, Di Maio, Salvini and Meloni.
Their presence on popular television talk shows is constant and
intensive. Hosts compete to have them in their studios every
night. Yet, it appears that beside and beyond that substantial free
publicity they need to maintain direct contact with their con-
stituencies, resorting to a likewise intense dialogue by means of
the social media. This is an example of a hyper-mediatized sort of
populist communication, typical of a hybrid media environment.
From our analysis there emerges some signiﬁcant evidence of
what we have called ‘endemic populism’ displayed by non-
populist leaders (e.g., the leader of the Democratic Party) who do
not disdain coupling populist narratives (like the ‘us’ vs. ‘them’
opposition) with more conventional political disputes. Both the
stark populist socially mediated communication and the populist-
sounding communication of ‘occasional’ populists assume
nuanced patterns that reﬂect the degree of populism of their
respective political formations.
The several meanings of ‘the appeal to the people’ make it
possible to highlight the differences among leaders’ rhetorical
construction of the polarisation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. These
qualitative differences relate to the party’s key topics and the
speciﬁc context or issue addressed. For example, Giorgia Meloni
and Matteo Salvini both identify the people on national/ethnic
bases, but while the leader of the Northern League prefers to
counterpose ‘Italians’ to illegal immigrants, the leader of Brothers
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of Italy often sets ‘Italians’ in opposition to the government or
élites in general. On the other hand, Luigi Di Maio and Silvio
Berlusconi both prefer to ‘invoke the people’ as the actual
sovereign even though the 5 Stars Movement leader is more used
to opposing this people to the ruling élites in wrapping his
messages on Facebook. The case of Matteo Renzi is very inter-
esting because even though he often adopts a populist narrative
represented by the rhetorical construction of ‘us’ against ‘them’,
he identiﬁes ‘the people’ on cultural bases unlike the other lea-
ders. His ‘performance’ not only conﬁrms the presence of an
‘endemic populism’ that overﬂows from strictly populist precincts
into the general political discourse, but also shows that populist
references are often used as a communication strategy by the
main Italian leaders.
Moreover, the ‘Populism Index’ shows the relationship among
Italian leaders and the three core aspects of populism can be
understood as a ‘thin ideology’ (Mudde, 2004). This relationship,
represented by the different levels of populism (light, moderate
and bold), on the one hand highlights each leader’s commu-
nicative choices represented by the different degree of populism
in their posts. On the other hand, it conﬁrms that it can be very
difﬁcult to identify speciﬁc actors as sheer populists or non-
populists. This is because the fragmentation of the populist
ideology and the strong polarisation, typical of the social media
environment, perfectly ﬁt with the adoption of one or more
populist references according to leaders’ aims and communicative
strategies (Bracciale and Martella, 2017).
Lastly, there seems to emerge a political cleavage in the dif-
ferent degrees of populist communication adopted by Italian
leaders. Centre-right and centre-left leaders (Silvio Berlusconi and
Matteo Renzi, respectively) prefer a ‘Soft Populist’ communica-
tion; extreme-right leaders (Giorgia Meloni and Matteo Salvini)
post more ‘Bold Populist’ messages. Indeed, all the opposition
parties’ leaders (Di Maio, Meloni, Salvini) are characterised by a
‘Moderate or Bold Populist’ communication. This means that
‘Soft Populism’ is the communicative trait of the Italian main-
stream parties, in spite of the ‘Moderate or Bold Populism’ that
appears to be the communicative characteristic of the opposition
parties. This behaviour arguably relates to the intimate core of
populism: the rhetorical construction of ‘us’ against ‘them’ works
perfectly as a tool of attack and contraposition that fosters the
‘hyper-mediatisation’ of the populist messages and ﬁts with
opposition parties’ aims. ‘Bold Populist’ communication is more
common among extreme-right parties’ leaders, above all in
Matteo Salvini’s posts. This last result is very similar to what
already emerged in Jagers and Walgrave (2007) about Vlaams
Blok communication and ‘complete populism’, conﬁrming in
some way the validity of the index and its possible applicability to
different national contexts.
The Italian case undoubtedly shows that in a hybrid media
context and hyper-mediatized environment, socially mediated
populist communication has very distinctive characteristics.
Studying them more closely can help to further understand popu-
lism, its features, its degrees, its reach in society and in politics.
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Notes
1 The coefﬁcients of Krippendorff’s α for the groups were highly satisfactory in terms of
almost all variables (Krippendorff’s α > 0.79 and Percent agreement= 97%) by
convention established in the ﬁeld (Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007).
2 Italian media covered in a sensationalist way the judicial investigation of Renzi’s father,
suspected in February 2017 of trafﬁcking in inﬂuence (a criminal offence).
Fig. 3 Degrees of populism in Italy’s politicians’ Facebook communication. This ﬁgure shows the average of Facebook posts for each leader grouped by level
of populism. Soft Populism indicates the presence of one populist ideology fragment; Moderate Populism posts contain two populist ideology fragments;
and Bold Populism means that posts include three populist ideology fragments
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